In debates about the nature of mental states, anti-realism offers a counterpoint to the belief that concepts like belief, desire, and intention refer to real, mind-independent entities. But anti-realism isn’t a single idea—it comes in two main forms, each with its own assumptions and implications: instrumentalism and eliminativism.
1. Instrumentalist Anti-Realism
Instrumentalists don’t deny that it’s helpful to talk about people as having beliefs or desires. What they question is whether these mental states actually exist as real internal entities. For the instrumentalist, saying someone “believes the bridge is unsafe” is not a literal report of an inner state; it’s a predictive shorthand, a way of making sense of behavior.
This view treats folk psychology (our everyday way of explaining behavior) as a useful fiction—something that works in practice but may not correspond to any deep, metaphysical truth. It’s like saying the sun “rises” in the east; that’s not scientifically accurate, but it’s convenient. Likewise, mental state language may survive not because it’s true in a strict sense, but because it’s practically effective.
2. Eliminativist Anti-Realism
Eliminativists go further. They argue that folk psychology isn’t just an imprecise model—it’s a false theory, one that will eventually be replaced by neuroscience. According to this view, concepts like belief, desire, and even consciousness may have no future in serious scientific discourse. They are, like alchemy or geocentrism, outdated frameworks that made sense in their time but now hold us back.
Eliminativists are skeptical that we’ll find one-to-one matches between folk-psychological terms and actual brain processes. Instead, they believe the future of psychology lies in developing a radically new vocabulary based on biology and computation—not folk intuitions.
Why This Matters
These two forms of anti-realism raise deep questions about how we understand ourselves and others. If instrumentalists are right, then much of our moral and social reasoning is built on concepts that are only pragmatically valid. If eliminativists are right, then many of the ways we talk about the mind may one day seem quaint, or even misguided.
Yet both views also challenge us to sharpen our theories and rethink the limits of intuition. Whether mental states are tools or illusions, anti-realism forces us to confront the possibility that the mind is stranger—and more complex—than folk wisdom ever imagined.