The Mahāyāna Buddhist path is generous in its compassion, but cautious in its application. When it comes to overriding precepts — such as killing, stealing, or lying — even out of compassion, the tradition raises careful and sobering questions: Who is spiritually qualified to do such things? And once such a need arises, is the action obligatory?
First, it’s essential to understand that the doctrine of skilful means (upāya-kauśalya) is not meant to be applied casually. The Upāya-kauśalya Sūtra itself acknowledges the dangers of misuse. It advises that such teachings be kept hidden from those unfamiliar with the Mahāyāna perspective, lest they be misunderstood as license for wrongdoing .
There is also disagreement among Mahāyāna authorities. The thinker Jinaputra argues that only lay Bodhisattvas may override the precepts in this way — for example, by killing or stealing. In contrast, Tsong-kha-pa, a prominent Tibetan scholar, allows for monks to kill, steal, or lie in rare compassionate circumstances without incurring “defeat” in their monastic discipline. However, he draws the line at sexual activity: a monk may not break celibacy even for compassionate reasons, since doing so would betray the foundations of monastic training and provide no genuine benefit to others .
More broadly, the Śikṣā-samuccaya (a Mahāyāna ethical anthology) suggests that only highly advanced Bodhisattvas, those at or beyond the “Noble” stages of the path, are truly capable of performing such ethically complex actions with the required clarity and detachment. Tsong-kha-pa reinforces this, emphasizing that these situations are “an exclusive province of the capable,” and fraught with karmic peril for those who overestimate themselves .
But even if such acts are allowed, are they ever required?
Here, tradition again diverges. The Bodhisattva-bhūmi, a key Mahāyāna text, does not initially present these acts as obligatory. But later Tibetan interpretations — especially a “new commentary” — begin to treat failure to act compassionately in such moments as a misdeed. This view became common in Tibet, although Tsong-kha-pa himself did not list compassionate killing as an obligation .
In China, versions of the Bodhisattva-bhūmi translated by the scholar Hsüan Tsang affirm that compassionate intervention — even through precept-breaking — is sometimes morally necessary. The omission of such an act, if it means allowing great suffering to unfold, may itself be seen as a lapse of duty .
In summary, Mahāyāna ethics does not treat these acts lightly. Compassion is essential, but it must be paired with deep wisdom, restraint, and readiness to accept the karmic consequences. The right to act beyond the precepts is reserved for those who are not only deeply trained, but also fearless in their compassion — and humble enough to act only when there is no better way.